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"A Fair Trial in a Fair Tribunal": A Preface to the
Petitioners' Brief in Caperton v. Massey
Theodore B. Olson* and Amir C. Tayranit
As Justice Kennedy stated at the outset of his opinion in Caperton v. Massey, "a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement
of due process."' The Court's decision in Caperton reaffirmed that
basic constitutional guarantee. While the facts of the Caperton
case are, in the Court's words, "extraordinary," the constitutional
principles on which the decision rests are elementary; they are
fundamental to our system of justice and essential to maintaining
public confidence in our judicial system.
Every litigant has a right to have his case heard by a judge who
will hold "the balance nice, clear, and true"2 between the partieseven where one of the litigants has the financial resources to facilitate the election of the judge who will decide the parties' dispute.
Where that is the case, state canons of judicial ethics and judges'
introspective appraisals of their own ability to decide a dispute in
a neutral, evenhanded fashion are insufficient to ensure that all
litigants receive what is promised to them by the Due Process
Clause and by the words engraved in the fagade of the Supreme
Court: "Equal Justice Under Law."
In another respect, however, Caperton may well prove to be extraordinary. With the reaffirmation of the basic constitutional
principle that parties cannot be permitted to select the judges in
their own case, litigants may no longer have an incentive to spend
massive sums of money in an effort to elect the judges who will
decide their disputes. If that proves to be true-if Caperton turns
out to be a rarely invoked and infrequently implicated precedentthen the decision will truly have been a victory for the principles
of judicial independence and procedural fairness on which it so
firmly rests.
* Theodore B. Olson is a partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. He has argued
58 cases in the Supreme Court of the United States, including Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co.
t Amir C. Tayrani is an associate at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, and briefed the
Caperton case at the certiorari and merits stages.
1. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266 (2009).
2. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260.
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